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Humans, Computers, and
Binding Commitment t
Addison C. Harris Lecture
October 26, 1999
MARGARET JANE RADIN*
I. INTRODUCTION:
THE PROBLEM OF CONSENT
As commerce moves online-as the borderless digital networked environment
becomes the milieu of exchange transactions-we are seeing new kinds of contracts.
Deals are being made between a human and a computer, or between two computers
managed only remotely by humans. The locus of contracting is the human/computer
interface, rather than the relational interface between two humans. In this Article, I
want to pose some questions about the effect of these new contracts on our
understanding of contractual commitment and on the law that determines which
commitments are binding.
A. Contract-as-Consent and
Contract-as-Product
As a preface to this exploration, I will distinguish between two views or models of
contract. Call one model "contract-as-consent"; call the other model "contract-as-
product." Contract-as-consent is the dominant view in ordinary discourse; contract-
as-product is submerged in that discourse (except among some economists) but aptly
describes much of transactional practice.
The contract-as-consent model is the traditional picture of how binding
commitment is arrived at between two humans. It involves a meeting of the minds
between two humans, or at least voluntariness, or at least consent. These terms are
both fuzzy and contested; the traditional picture is out of focus. At minimum, consent
t Copyright 2000 by Margaret Jane Radin. Permission is hereby granted to reproduce and
distribute this Article in whole or in part for personal, professional or educational purposes,
provided such copies are disseminated at or below cost, provided that each copy bears this
notice, and provided that the Indiana Law Journal is credited as the original published source.
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involves a knowing understanding of what one is doing in a context in which it is
actually possible for one to do otherwise, and an affirmative action in doing
something, rather than a merely passive acquiescence in accepting something. These
indicia translate into requirements that terms be understood, that alternatives be
available, and probably that bargaining be possible.
The contract-as-product model is the typical model assumed by economists. In this
model, the terms are part of the product, not a conceptually separate bargain; physical
product plus terms are a package deal. The fact that a chip inside an electronics item
will wear out after a year is no less and no more a feature of the item and its quality
than the fact that the terms that come with the item specify that all disputes must be
resolved in California under California law. In this model, unseen contract terms are
no more and no less significant than unseen internal design features; and it is not
remarkable that there is no choice other than the take-it-or-leave-it choice not to buy
the package.
The contract-as-product model may describe a great deal of modern commercial
practice, even before commerce started to move online. Commercial practice has long
deviated from the traditional picture of minds meeting about terms, or autonomous
consent. Nevertheless, the traditional picture hangs on in the conceptual apparatus
legal actors bring to bear on contracts and contract disputes, and it is instantiated
sometimes in commercial practice.
How will the move online affect contract, especially the disjunction-and hitherto
uneasy coexistence-between the picture of contract-as-consent and the real world
of contract-as-product? Two interrelated sets of questions arise here: one revolves
around the future of the ideal of voluntary commitment, the other around the future
of entitlement regimes, such as privacy and intellectual property. With respect to the
ideal of voluntary commitment, will the move online exacerbate the disjuncture
between the consent-based picture and the reality of transactions? Or, on the contrary,
will availability of customization online to some extent create consent-based
transactions where we do not have them now? With respect to the future of
entitlement regimes, we should recognize that such regimes could become unstable
because of waivers in ubiquitous form contracts. At least, we will have to start
arguing about whether the normative backing of any entitlement rule is strong enough
to make it nonwaivable by contract, so property arguments might metamorphose into
arguments about impermissible contract terms.
B. Has a Picture Held Us Captive?
Rather than start right out on what terms might be impermissible in cyber-contracts
and why, in this Article I want to back up and look at the ordinary-discourse view of
contract-as-consent, and how it is problematized. What got me started on this project
is that contracts in electronic commerce do not look like the traditional picture of
meeting of the minds or autonomous consent. The process of contract formation
involves the human/computer interface, not the interaction of two autonomous
repositories of Kantian personhood. O.K., you might say, but the traditional picture
is pretty fuzzy,I and in spite of the traditional picture (whatever it is) most contracts
1. See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (1970).
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in "real" space-the offline world---do not look that way, either. Even if the
traditional picture still holds some sway in our minds, that has not prevented practice
from moving beyond it. It is not true that "a picture held us captive."
'2
Yet, I think the picture has held us captive to some extent, because it remains a
cultural artifact. Lay people (for example, software engineers, marketing managers)
still refer to it quite straightforwardly and without qualification. Some legislative
drafters still refer to the paradigm case of contract as autonomous agreement between
two parties.' In the offline world, courts often do validate contracts that deviate from
the traditional picture, but when they do, they tend to conceive of such contracts as
exceptions to something-that something being a version of the traditional picture.
The question I want to ask is: if such exceptional contracts turn out to be completely
unexceptional, indeed the mainstay of binding commitment in cyberspace, does that
mean a rethinking of the basis of binding commitment is now needed? After all, it has
been said that enough of a quantitative difference is a qualitative difference.
Yet, if the offline contracts that deviate from the traditional picture (and the
traditional conceptualizations of the basis of commitment) are in practice the majority
of contracts, maybe what is happening in cyberspace does not represent so much of
a quantitative difference. Then, will our previous understanding of contracts that
deviate from the traditional picture carry us readily into the digital era? Maybe so.
But maybe not: even if the percentage of all contracts that deviate from the traditional
picture does not change drastically as contracting moves into cyberspace, the new
methods of contract formation, along with the Web's transparency about what the
contracts actually say, may draw more attention to their deviance from that picture.
That may further undermine the traditional ways of conceiving of contract.
Perhaps that would be a good thing, since the traditional picture is fuzzy and does
not match much of our practice. We will have cleared away the underbrush, so to
speak, and that will facilitate recognizing the need for justification. If not the
autonomous consent of B, what justifies A's rearranging of B's entitlements and
wealth? Economic efficiency is a frequently proposed answer, of course. Economic
analysis, within its zone of applicability, can make a good case for enforcement of
contracts without consent in specific classes of circumstances (however we define
consent, for it is surely a contested concept).4 Economic efficiency has not yet been
thought to authorize a blanket change from property rules (requiring consent,
however defined) to liability rules (requiring payment as determined by a third party
such as a court, but no consent, often likened to "private eminent domain").5
In short, I believe that there exists something of a puzzle about how to justify
2. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 115 (G.E.M. Anscombe
trans., 1953).
3. See, e.g., infra Part IV (discussing the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act
("UETA")).
4. The history of the liberal concept of consent, with its varying interpretations and
manifestations, is laid out in fascinating detail in DON HERzOG, HAPPY SLAVES (1989).
5. The property-rule vs. liability-rule terminology comes from Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). It is handy terminology in a setting where economic
exchange is the issue, though it has its drawbacks otherwise. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODmEs ch. 2 (1996); infra Part VI.
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changes of position imposed on one private party by another, and that the advent of
contract in cyberspace may make the puzzle more urgent. The problem, in a nutshell,
is that our ordinary-discourse commitment to a consent-based system will come into
clearer conflict with practices that do not seem consensual.
We could make the problem go away by attenuating what we mean by consent. The
more cases we previously might have thought of as instances of imposed terms we
can rethink as consensual, the less we need to worry about private eminent domain.
Suppose we learn to believe, for example, that once I set in motion a computer that
I ought to know is running a program capable of accepting terms from computers
programmed by others to offer them, then I have "consented" to any terms it accepts,
regardless of whether I actually knew that the program could accept terms and
regardless of whether the terms are expected or foreseeable. In that case, we could
still manage to avoid the need to rethink the basis of commitment in terms other than
consent.
Perhaps we could make the problem go away simply by replacing the ordinary
discourse contract-as-consent model with the economists' contract-as-product model.
There are some difficulties here, primarily that we cannot make one concept be
replaced by another in ordinary discourse simply by decreeing it. Even if we could,
in order for the market to function properly, buyers must know what product they are
buying. Even in the contract-as-product model, therefore, effective disclosure would
be required. This result is likely to be politically unpopular in some quarters, because
very often the free market will not bring about effective disclosure of what the
product actually "is."
We could also make the problem go away by attenuating what we mean by "private
party." If the public/private distinction gets obliterated in ordinary understanding,
then "private" eminent domain will be no less and no more justified than "public."
My conclusion is that I do not believe our ordinary understandings on these matters
will change quickly enough to avoid the problem. We might have to face the fact that
our commitment to a conception of voluntariness in transactions is at odds with much
of our commercial world of exchange.
II. EMERGING FORMS OF ONLINE CONTRACT
Let me begin by outlining three methods of contract formation in electronic
commerce. They can go by the names "click-wrap," "machine-made," and "viral"
contracts. In each case, the procedure raises questions about whether it is really
contractual, because it deviates from the traditional conceptualization of contract-as-
consent.
A. Contract as Click
(a.kIa. "Click-Wrap")
A great many commercial websites have taken to posting fine-print terms on
interior pages. There are enough of them to have spawned a couple of
acronyms---"TOS" (Terms of Service) and "COU" (Conditions of Use). At
1128 [Vol. 75:1125
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www.Disney.com, for example, "where the magic lives online,"6 the following link
appears at the bottom of the home page in small print. Many users probably will not
scroll down to the bottom of the page, and if they do not, they will not see the link.
"Please click here for legal restrictions and terms of use applicable to this site. Use
of this site signifies your agreement to the terms of use."7
If you do click on this link, you will find a lot of fine print. One portion says:
By uploading materials to any Forum or submitting any materials to us, you
automatically grant (or warrant that the owner of such rights has expressly
granted) us a perpetual, royaltyfree, irrevocable, nonexclusive right and license to
use, reproduce, modify, adapt, publish, translate, create derivative works from, and
distribute such materials or incorporate such materials into any form, medium, or
technology now known or later developed throughout the universe. In addition,
you warrant that all so-called moral rights in those materials have been waived.8
Another portion says:
You agree that any action at law or in equity arising out of or relating to these
terms shall be filed only in the state or federal courts located in Los Angeles
County and you hereby consent and submit to the personal jurisdiction of such
courts for the purposes of litigating any such action.'
Consider another example, found at Beyond.com, a purveyor of downloadable
software whose commercials have featured a naked telecommuter.' On the home
page you will find, if you take the trouble to scroll down all the way to the bottom,
a small link for "Terms of Use," which does not even request that you click on it. If
you choose to click on it you will find a lot of fine print, including this: "Beyond.com
reserves the right to make changes to this site and to these terms and conditions at any
time. Any such modifications will become effective upon the date they are first
posted to this site.""
Amidst the fine print you will also find this:
This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with and governed by the
internal laws of the State of California (as permitted by Section 1646.5 of the
California Civil Code or any similar successor provision) without giving effect to
any choice of law rule that would cause the application of the laws of any
jurisdiction other than the internal laws of the State of California to the rights and
duties of the parties.... Beyond.com may freely transfer, assign, or delegate all
or any part of this Agreement, and any rights and duties thereunder, without the
requirement of consent. This Agreement will be binding upon and inure to the
6. Disney Homepage (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.disney.go.com>.
7. Id.
8. DisneyLegal Conditions (visited Feb. 12,2000) <http:lldisney.go.comlegal/conditions
of use.html?clk=8884>.
9. Id.
10. See Beyond.com Terms of Use (visited Feb. 12, 2000) <http://www.beyond.com
/termsofuse.htm>.
11. Id.
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benefit of the heirs, successor, and permitted assigns of the parties.' 2
There is every reason to believe that almost all commercial websites will use a TOS
or COU. Right now, each TOS or COU seems to be individually drafted. The
examples I have given so far lean toward the contract-as-product model; the terms are
there whether you see them or not. A contrasting approach is taken by eBay.com.
That site makes every effort to get you to read and understand its terms, with
explanatory resources you can click on, people you can e-mail, or even talk to on the
phone. 3 It is an example of trying to implement a consent model. In spite of the
proliferation of different terms, and in spite of the fact that some sites lean toward the
contract-as-product approach and others toward a contract-as-consent approach, it is
very possible that industries will soon settle on standardized sets of terms. I will
return later to the interesting issues surrounding standardization in this context.
B. Machine-Made Contract
By machine-made contract, I am referring to a loose category of transactions that
are structured in the first instance by machines, with the humans in the background
at some remove. Strictly speaking, it is a machine-implemented transactional structure
when I use my personal computer to click on a box on my screen which then registers
with a server computer somewhere else. I am dubbing transactional structures
(whether or not contractual is a question to be answered) machine-made, however,
only if the human pushing the key is not so directly involved. Machine-made contract
in this sense falls into two broad categories: computers as electronic "agents," and
computers as electronic enforcers.
1. Electronic "Agents"
In this category of machine-made contract, the idea is that two computers (rather
than two humans, or one human and one computer) "negotiate" with each other and
arrive at "agreement" with each other. Using the term "agency" in the locution
"electronic agency" has become common, so I am adopting the usage, but before
proceeding I want to register a caveat. The terms should seem peculiar in this context.
When a computer does something "for" me that I have allowed it to be programmed
to do, it is only an "agent" in a mechanical sense; it carries out the instructions of the
program automatically so I will not have to do it manually. The term "agent" means
something else when we are considering human "agency." Human "agency" refers
to the freedom of autonomous beings. Human "agency" figures prominently in the
traditional picture of contract-as-consent: it takes a human "agent" to be able to give
voluntary consent. The law of "agency," which developed to cover situations in
which one human delegated tasks to another, perhaps partakes of both senses; but no
"agent" in a "principal-agent" relationship could be in the mechanized relationship
that one who causes a computer to run a program is with that computer's activities.
Use of the term "electronic agent" runs together these meanings and may cause us not
12. Id.
13. See eBay.coin (visited Jan. 20, 2000) <http://www.ebay.com>.
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to see how the issue of consent is being submerged or metamorphosed.
Right now, the computer-to-computer electronic agent scenario is primarily being
developed in industrial procurement and general supply-chain management. In the
generation following Electronic Data Interchange ("EDI")-a set of protocols
developed in the 1980s for information sharing between trading partners-both
extranets and the Web are being used to couple the vast power of digital automation
with principles of just-in-time manufacture and distribution.'4 In this form of
industrial organization, many repetitive tasks are or will be accomplished by machine.
Among these tasks are ordering and paying for supplies that are routinely needed at
certain points in a process. The ordering, delivery, and payment for such supplies
means that there are contractual terms surrounding the transaction-the time of
delivery, what to do if the supplies do not arrive in time or are defective, what to do
if the payment is late, and all the other transactional parameters that people contract
about. All of this can in principle be handled primarily by machine, using computer
programs that "negotiate" with each other and enter into "agreements" with each
other.
Although automated supply-chain management is in the vanguard of the form of
machine-made contract I have (reluctantly) designated electronic agency, in the near
future these machine-made contracts may well become very widespread. Electronic
agents may shop for us, organize our homes and offices for us, and so on.
2. Electronic Enforcers
In the second category of machine-made contract, known as digital rights
management systems or trusted systems, computer programs enforce the terms of a
transfer of digital content. The system is "trusted" (more trustworthy than a human)
because it is technologically incapable of deviating from the instructions it is given. 5
Those instructions may be, for example, to enforce a thirty-day license by erasing the
content from the licensee's machine when the thirty days are up; or to enforce a
restriction against copying either by preventing the copy from being made or by
erasing the content from the licensee's machine ifcopying is attempted. Such detailed
self-enforcement mechanisms will likely be a significant aspect of the
human/computer interface for electronic commerce. They are viewed with alarm by
some, but welcomed by others whose vision of anarchic self-ordering in cyberspace
includes widespread technological self-enforcement.'
6
14. See John P. Fischer, Note, Computers as Agents: A Proposed Approach to Revised
U.C.C. Article 2, 72 IND. L.J. 545 (1997).
15. See, e.g., Mark Stefik, Letting Loose the Light: Igniting Commerce in Electronic
Publication, in INTERNET DREAMs 219, 226-28 (Mark Stefik ed., 1996); see also Julie E.
Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy of "Rights Management ", 97
MicH. L. REv. 462, 471 (1998).
16. Of the many who believe that technology, not law, will structure cyberspace, some
think that technological self-enforcement will succeed in locking up property rights even more
securely than fences in real space (a result that some deplore and some applaud); and some
think that hackers will always stay one step ahead of technological locks, undermining
property rights in information (a result that some deplore and some applaud). A particular
configuration of contradictory beliefs is held by those I call "anarcho-cyberlibertarians," who
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C. Viral Contracts
The analogy of viral propagation has proved apt for various aspects of information
transfer in a networked digital environment. Information can be rapidly replicated,
and each replica in turn can be rapidly replicated, and so on through a chain of
replication throughout the network. Most people are familiar with computer viruses,
which are destructive software programs that are spread through successive
replication in this way. But the analogy holds more broadly. The economics of the
networked environment have engendered a phenomenon known as viral marketing.
In this form of marketing, the seller provides incentives for buyers to obtain other
customers, and for those customers in turn to obtain other customers, and so on.17
Many commercial websites have "affiliates" programs designed to do this."
In the future, we should expect to see more and more viral marketing. Instead of
locking up intellectual property, for example, many purveyors of content will be
better off by allowing their content to propagate freely, as soon as there is a viable
automatic payment mechanism than can cause payment to be extracted from whoever
downloads the content, wherever it goes. Moreover, much content on the Web is (and
more will be) free advertising for follow-on services. The more this content
propagates, the better for its initiator, as long as technological safeguards exist to
maintain its integrity and keep the advertiser's name on it.
In keeping with the viral character of content propagation, a transactional
phenomenon I call viral contract is arising. A viral contract (or attempted viral
contract, because we do not know yet whether these attempts will result in an actual
contract) is simply an attempt to make comnmitrnents run with a digital object. For
example, in the viral advertising program I described above, the advertiser who
initiates the spread of the content would like to make each and every user into whose
hands the content comes be obligated not to alter the content or remove the
advertiser's name from it. The initiator would like, in other words, to attach the
obligations regarding the content to the content itself, so that everyone who comes
into possession of the content would also inherit the obligations to the initiator. Viral
contract attempts to make the fine print run with the product. In a sense, it is the
ultimate instantiation of the contract-as-product model.
The clearest instance of attempted viral contract today involves open source
software. The Linux operating system, which now has a nontrivial share of the
market, is governed by a version of the General Public License promulgated by
Richard Stallman and the Free Software Foundation, in conjunction with a kernel
developed by Linus Torvalds. The open source "movement" is based on the idea that
each recipient in a chain of distribution is bound to make public (or make
are committed to anarchic nonlegal self-organization and at the same time to strong property
rights, which must stem from a legal regime. See Margaret Jane Radin & R. Polk Wagner, The
Myth ofPrivate Ordering: Rediscovering Legal Realism in Cyberspace, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1295, 1297 (1998).
17. Note www.mobshop.com, whose business model involves viral marketing. The site
offers an item for sale whose price goes down as you get more people to buy it (and they in turn
get more people to buy it) within a set time frame.
18. See, e.g., Associate Web (visited June 8, 2000) <www.associateweb.com>.
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available to all those in the chain) any improvements effected in the source code. 19
The license uses copyrightto make copyrightnarrower (keeping in the public domain
what otherwise would have been property of the improvers). Because of this
narrowing effect, the license is known as "copyleft." However, in what might be
called "supercopyright," the same technique can also be used to attempt to broaden
copyright (or for that matter other intellectual property entitlement schemes). An
example would be a "running" waiver of the fair use defense to copyright
infringement, in which a distributor seeks to foreclose that defense for all users in a
chain of distribution.
Software publishers have hitherto "licensed" rather than sold copies of their
software so that they could restrict transfer, and so that they could maintain
restrictions after a sublicense was effected. Software publishers most likely would
prefer viral sales contracts with running obligations on all transferees in a chain of
distribution, and merely doubt their legal enforceability (as well as whether
transferees would accept such obligations in the market). But if market forces bring
the total restraint-on-alienation model into disfavor, and changes in the law validate
viral contracting, we might see viral contracting become very commonplace.
III. ARE THESE ONLINE CONTRACTS NEW LEGAL ANIMALS?
SOURCES OF ANALOGY FROM THE OFFLINE WORLD
Some features of these online contracts seem problematic from the perspective of
the traditional picture of contract-as-consent. Many of Disney.com's visitors are
children and could not validly contract with Disney either online or offline. But
bypassing the issue of contractual competence, does the procedure together with the
substantive content of the terms generate binding commitment? Has contract
formation taken place between you and Disney if you never click on the link labeled
"Please click here for legal restrictions and terms of use"? Can Disney's proclamation
that use of the site signifies your agreement to the terms as they change from time to
time be sufficient to effectuate a transfer of your intellectual property rights
throughout the universe? Or to make you liable if the so-called "moral rights" that the
French say are not waivable in fact turn out not to be waived? And can Beyond.com,
which does not tell you that you ought to click on its terms of service, still render its
terms binding not only on you but on your successors as well? Although these
contracts deviate from the traditional picture, contracts we often see in the offline
world have probably occurred to you as analogies. Perhaps they can help us learn
how to deal with contracts in cyberspace.
A. Precursors of "Click-Wrap" Contracts
Website presentation of terms is analogous in certain significant respects to what
19. See The Open Source Page (visited Feb. 12,2000) <http://www.opensource.org>; see
also OPEN SOURCES: VOICES FROM THE OPEN SOURCE REVOLUTION (Chris Dibona et al. eds.,
1999); ERICS. RAYMOND, THECATHEDRALANDTHE BAZAAR: MUsiNGsON LiNUXAND OPEN
SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (1999); Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant
(last modified Dec. 2, 1999) <http://emoglen.law.columbia.edu/my_pubsanarchism.html>.
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is known as a shrink-wrap license, usually used in software distribution. (That, of
course, is where the term "click-wrap" comes from.) There are two different species
of shrink-wrap license. In the first kind, the terms are presented before purchase of
the software, on the box or plastic shrink-wrap that covers the box. The seller
maintains (and hopes) that when you break the shrink-wrap, it signifies that you have
agreed to the terms and a license contract is formed. In the second kind of shrink-
wrap license, the terms are not presented to you before you buy; instead, the outside
of the box informs you that there are terms inside that you will see later (perhaps on
the screen when you run the software) and that you will be bound to them if you use
the software. The contract-as-product model describes bothprocedures, especially the
second.
Primarily because courts remain committed to the ordinary language view of
contract-as-consent, the legal validity of shrink-wrap licenses-that is, whether or not
presentation of terms in this way causes a contract to be formed-remains in doubt.20
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,2" written by an economist judge who is friendly to the
contract-as-product model, has become well-known for validating a shrink-wrap
license of the second kind. In that case, ProCD's product was a CD containing a
telephone-number database. A purported contract that appeared on the screen when
the program was run prohibited users from copying the database. If valid, this was a
contractual extension of ProCD's rights under copyright law, since, under U.S.
copyright law, databases are not protected if they are "unoriginal."2 Zeidenberg, the
defendant, relied on copyright law to copy the database; ProCD relied on contract law
to argue that he could not.
Although the terms were not seen by the buyer before he purchased the product,
Judge Easterbrook held that the contract was validly formed as long as two conditions
were met: (1) something on the outside of the box warned the consumer that terms
were inside, and (2) the consumer could return the product for a refund after seeing
the additional terms. 23 Although ProCD has become an influential case, especially
among software publishers, another judge in another jurisdiction might have held
otherwise in this case (as some have in other cases); 4 and what will happen in future
cases, if the matter is left up to the courts, is by no means certain.
A website that shows you its terms and says, "If you click in this box you have
agreed to my terms," under circumstances-in which the website is programmed so that
you will not be allowed to use the site if you do not, is somewhat analogous to a
shrink-wrap license of the first kind. The website is programmed so that the click
signifying "agreement" is required before you can use the site; similarly, you will not
get to use shrink-wrapped software if you do not signify "agreement" by breaking the
shrink-wrap. Some websites, such as eBay, are presenting their terms this way.
Although they are somewhat analogous to shrink-wrap of the first kind, the
analogy does not go all the way. For one thing, it is no doubt easier to read terms that
20. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL
L. REv. 1239 (1996).
21. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
22. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
23. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450.
24. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
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are presented to you on your computer screen than to read the ternis on a shrink-
wrapped package while you are in the store deciding whether to purchase it. Also, it
will be easier for you to retain a copy of the terms from the website, since you can
copy them and print them out, whereas if the terms are actually on the shrink-wrap,
they will be hard to read after you break it.
A website that says on the home page nothing more than "Terms of Use" might be
somewhat analogous to a shrink-wrap contract of the second kind. That kind of
shrink-wrap tells you on the outside only that there are binding terms inside.
Beyond.com's home page link says only "Terms of Use," and there are many
websites that do this.' A website like this is analogous to shrink-wrap of the second
kind only if we interpret its silence as saying to the user, "By continuing to use this
site you are bound to a set of terms which you will only see if you choose to click on
them." Under this interpretation it is analogous to becoming bound to further terms
inside the box (or on the first screen). But the interpretation stretches things; silence
is in fact not the same thing as alerting you that further terms await you inside. Also
detracting from the analogy is the fact that with software purchase the terms usually
show themselves to you, and in the website case you must affirmatively do something
in order to see them. Recall also that even in ProCD, where the judge was quite
sympathetic to the shrink-wrap procedure, a condition for its validity was that the user
be able to unwind the deal after viewing the terms (for example, by returning the
product for a refund).26 For many digital contracts of this type it is rather difficult for
the consumer to return the product after viewing the terms. (A group of Linux users
who tried to return the Windows softvare (or operating system) found that out.27)
We should keep in mind the real world and the prevalence of the contract-as-
product model in practice, even if many of us have not quite admitted that to
ourselves in our ordinary discourse about contract. In the offline world there are a
great many contracts in which the buyer does not see many of the terms until after
buying the product. We purchase a large range of items (including shrink-wrapped
software) over the telephone and have no opportunity to see the fine print until
shipment is received. Consumer product warranties are often inside the box. In some
classes of these contracts, such as the fine-print inserts that come with my credit card
bill once in awhile, new terms are imposed at the seller's will from time to time. In
all of these contracts, it appears that the promisor must at least be given the option of
declining after the fact to be bound, by unwinding his or her initial acceptance of the
product (for example, ceasing to use the credit card). It does not appear, though, that
the option in practice is anything more than theoretically possible. Even though I am
a lawyer, and actually once in awhile look at fine print (though not that often), I have
25. See, e.g., Stanford Home Page (visited Feb. 2, 2000) <http://www.stanford.edu>.
26. See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1456.
27. The Windows license told users that if they did not like the terms when they saw them,
they should return the software for a refund. A group of Linux users divested their computers
of Windows and attempted to obtain a refund. Neither the store that sold them the software nor
Microsoft thought it was the appropriate party to fulfill the terms. Finally, the Linux users had
a demonstration outside Microsoft's office in the Bay Area. Reports said it was a civilized
demonstration in which Microsoft employees came out and served them coffee and doughnuts.
See, e.g., Wired News, Linux Users Shut Their Windows (visited Feb. 9, 2000) <http:
I/vww.wired.comfnewsftechnology/0,1282,17926.00.html>.
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never packed up and sent back something I bought over the telephone because I did
not like the fine print on the back of the invoice when it came. Do you know anyone
who has?
B. Precursors to Machine-Made Contracts
1. The Electronic Agent Scenario
Earlier I described one kind of machine-made contract, an artifact of an automated
industrial procurement process in which one firm's machine "negotiates" and
"agrees" with another's. At first glance, this situation may look something like the
classic "battle of the forms." The "battle" arises where buyer's purchase order,
dispatched by one human "agent" for the buyer, has one set of fine-print terms, and
seller's invoice, dispatched by a human "agent" for the seller, has another.28 Always
recalling my earlier caveat about the slippage in the meaning of the term "agency,"
we can see that using electronic agents in the manner envisioned is not quite like the
"battle of the forms." In fact, machines can often do better at resolving the battle than
humans have done. Suppose machine A, for the seller, runs a program that can accept
terms one, two, and three, and machine B, for the buyer, runs a program that can
accept terms three, four, and five. Then the machines can "agree" to a term that both
parties have approved, namely term three. (Of course, we are now assuming that
permitting a computer under one's supervision to run a program that accepts term
three counts as "approving" that term; that is a question we will have to investigate
later.)
Once we are past the initial simple scenario, the machine-to-machine context leads
to difficulties. If machine A accepts terms one, two, and three while machine B
accepts terms two, three, and four, the programs would need priority rules for
deciding whether to "agree" to two or three. The programs would also have to agree
on those priority rules, or at least fird a way to have each system of priority rules
arrive at the same result. More important, a human "agent" often would want to agree
to two only if one is also agreed to. Generally, the individual terms in a set are
interdependent; it is the entire set of terms that matters economically. (That is, I might
accept a shorter warranty, but'only if the price is also lowered.)
Once we realize that it is the entire set of terms that matters, we realize that
machine A is likely to be programmed with one or more sets of terms so that it will
only do business with machine Bs that are programmed with at least one set of terms
in common. This likelihood is one reason to think that standardized sets of terms may
become quite prevalent in the digital world. (I will come back to the topic of
28. The legislation attempting to deal with this situation, U.C.C. § 2-207 (1992), has been
roundly criticized. It is said to be too complex, ambiguous, and readily misunderstood; it does
not deal adequately with all the types of cases that arise, and in some scenarios irrationally
gives one party all of the terms in its form depending on the order in which the forms were sent.
See, e.g., JAMES J. WHITE&ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIALCODE § 1-3 (4th ed.
1995) (devoting over 19 pages in hornbook analyzing problems with section 2-207, in which
authors disagree with each other, but conclude they "see no way to apply 2-207 that does not
sometimes give an unearned and unfair advantage to the person who happens to send the first,
or in some cases the second, document").
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standardized terms in the digital networked environment.)
The capability of machines in resolving some of the battles of the past over terms
may put off the point at which human judgment is required. At some point, however,
machine capability comes to an end, and we must tackle the difficult job of
programming machines to "know" when they must stop and summon a human to
exercise human judgment. Consider the situation if sets of terms in the commercial
environment are incompletely standardized. Suppose that machine A, programmed
with a set of terms M (containing 100 terms including z), encounters machine B
programmed with the set of terms M' (containing 99 identical terms but z'instead of
z). In that case, since computers are literal-minded, machine A would not accept
machine B's terms. But a human might see immediately that the deal should still be
made, because the choice between z and z' is unimportant.
It might not solve the problem simply to program machine A to accept terms that
are close enough, say ninety-nine percent the same, because the other one percent
could always be a doubling of the price or a waiver of intellectual property rights, and
machine A will not "know" that unless it can be programmed to "know." Perhaps it
could be programmed to deal with all known variants of terms like z that have extant
variants. Instead, machine A could perhaps be programmed to alert a human (let out
a beep or put a dialogue box on the screen) in the event it encounters set M'. If not,
it will probably have to do this at some point, such as when it encounters an unknown
variant, unless encounters with unknown terms simply void the deal.
The broader notion of replacing human "agents" with electronic agents will give
rise to new problems, or at least new perspectives on old ones. Consider the practice
of employing a personal shopper for gifts, or a (human) agent to purchase art for a
collection. The human agent can be empowered to make binding purchases for me
without my consent to each purchase. It will be more difficult to program a computer
to make judgments about what will fit in my collection and what will not, and how
it will "know" when it needs to get my approval on a specific item which might be
borderline. The kinds of transactional safeguards that will be needed will be different.
Fooling a computer is a different sort of operation than defrauding a human.
Computers are more easily fooled in many ways. They do not know when you are
joking, or when you meant 100 even though you typed 1000. They do not know when
a painting is genuine. On the other hand, they are less easily fooled in some other
ways-they make fewer errors in mathematics, for example. They are more "trusted"
than humans-they do not embezzle, for example. Although the system may crash,
a computer-except in science fiction-will not embark on a frolic of its own.
2. Electronic Enforcers
The imposition of terms by a rights management system may resist assimilation to
the category of contractual arrangements. Such a system is a faithful "agent" for the
purveyor of content, of course, because it makes the content available to the user only
on the terms it is programmed to enforce. But a big difference between this
arrangement and a contract between the purveyor and a recipient is that contracts can
be breached. In many contemporary economic interpretations of contract, the legal
system must expect (and welcome) breach when it is efficient under the
circumstances. Our system also contemplates breach when the user wants to exercise
a citizen's right to test the legality of the terms. When legality is tested, the state (on
1137
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
behalf of the community) passes on the acceptability of the terms, creating a check
on what kinds of terms can be implemented. Thus, self-enforcement is not the same
as enforcement by a court. The assimilation to contract seems at first glance
inapposite; rather, technological management systems look like a species of
technological self-help, less like legal enforcement than like sending over a
committee of one's friends to intimidate a storekeeper into paying a debt.
On second thought, the buyer's decision to purchase content on the terms enforced
by such a system could possibly be construed as contractual. The decision could be
understood to mean that the buyer is choosing to use such a system and accepts its
consequences. Under the contract-as-product model, the enforcement system is
merely a feature of the product, no less than the quality of the content or the length
of term for which it is licensed. Yet even under the contract-as-product model, the
notion of choice is still present: in order for the buyer to "choose" to purchase the
product including the self-enforcement system, the buyer would at least have to know
that the enforcement system was in operation and know its possible consequences;
other sources of the content without such an enforcement system attached might,
depending on the context, also be required for the buyer to be "choosing" to accept
such a system. The context to be investigated would include the importance of
acquiring the content (for example, is it medical information whose withholding
would be life-threatening?) and whether the system is imposed through market power
rather than competitive forces. Yet, viewing the transaction from the contract-as-
consent model, it looks like a contract in which the buyer cannot purchase the product
unless he "agrees" to waive all of his legal enforcement rights in favor of
technological self-help at the will of the other party. Even though contracts deviating
from the standard picture of autonomous consent are common in the offline world,
it is hard to think of any valid contracts in practice in which buyers are held to have
entered into such a blanket waiver.
C. Precursors to Viral Contracts
The category of terms that you inherit automatically from a predecessor in interest
also resists assimilation to the traditional picture of autonomous consent, at least if
those terms are obligations on you. (There is less problem with inheriting benefits.)
At minimum, if duties are handed on to successors in interest, in order to choose
whether to purchase the product with the obligation attached, one would expect a
requirement that the successor take with notice of the duty. Theoretically that gives
the buyer the information needed to decide on his price for the package (that is,
underlying item with duty attached). A buyer would presumably pay less for a
Porsche burdened with a running promise not to go over sixty miles per hour than she
would for a Porsche without such an attached obligation.
Section 2-210 of the UCC provides that in a range of cases involving sales of
goods, contractual rights can be assigned. However, the situation with delegation of
duties is less clear, because delegation can be prevented by agreement, and also by
a party who feels justifiably insecure if duties are handed on. Even when delegation
of duties is permitted, the delegating party remains liable on the obligation (absent
a novation). The question of automatic delegation of duties down a chain of
distribution (rather than a single delegation, with knowledge of the other party) has
not arisen because normally distributors of tangible goods have not sought to burden
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them with running restrictions or obligations. 9 (My example of the Porsche with a
speed limit servitude is fanciful.) I believe we have not seen many cases in the offline
world having to do with attempts to impose restrictions on tangible objects in the
form of duties that must be performed by anyone who purchases the object?0
The big exception, of course, is land obligations. The only standard situation in
which running obligations can be created in the offline world absent statutory
authorization is the use of covenants running with the land and equitable servitudes
in structuring real property entitlements. Notice is a bedrock requirement to make
these obligations valid. In addition to notice, the common law developed an elaborate
set of doctrines limiting the sorts of schemes of this kind that could be enforceable
(the obligations must "touch and concern land," for example). The doctrines are
notoriously confusing. Generously interpreted, they might be understood to operate
collectively to screen out contractual schemes that try to enact in a "private" manner
things that would be unconstitutional (if state-sponsored) or anti-competitive. (For
example: "whoever owns this house must not rent to non-Caucasians"; "whoever
owns this house must buy all groceries at the developer's store.") Obligations that run
with land are interestingly similar to standard-form contracts in that they are typically
imposed uniformly on groups of owners in a subdivision or condominium; they
function as "residential private government."' "Private" government has its pluses
for community formation, but its minuses when it does things "public" government
disallows. In any case, it is not true that a promise can run with the land to impose
obligations on successors just because the original parties say so; notice to successors
is needed, as well as something more than that to police such schemes for
acceptability.
The analogy with land obligations will not permit viral contracts to be enforced
against successors to digital objects just because the original promulgator says so.
This is true a fortiori in the case of obligations that run not just to the original
licensor, but to all others in a distributional community, like those in some open
source schemes, because ofthe unknown extent of the risk. When someone purchases
real estate burdened by a running obligation in a subdivision or a condominium, the
extent of obligation to others is known, because the number of parcels in the
subdivision or units in the condominium is known at the outset. The legal construct
29. See, e.g., Gary L. Monserud, The Privileges ofSuretyshipfor DelegatingParties Under
UCC Section 2-210 in Light of the New Restatement of Suretyship, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1307, 1393 (1996) ("In consumer purchases, making a sale subject to a buyer's assumption of
a seller's outstanding liabilities to an upstream seller is virtually unheard of.").
30. Warranties are an exception. They usually not only inure to the benefit of holders
remote in the distribution chain, but also impose the duty to perform under the warranty on
successors of the original distributor. There was debate about imposing liability without
contractual privity about the same time there was debate about imposition of tort liability
without privity, and both privity requirements fell at the same time. Running obligations, with
a notice requirement, are seen in the creation of security interests under Article 9 of the UCC.
There the rights of secured creditors that run with the collateral are a very limited set of rights
defined by a statutory scheme, not rights that can be created just by a private contract between
the creditor and the original debtor. (I owe this example to Dick Craswell.)
31. Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U. CHi.
L. REV. 253 (976).
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that buyers from the original developer intend to be obligated to all other parcel-
holders, whether or not those parcels have yet been sold, has some reasonable basis.
With viral distribution, however, this is not true. Contracts that run with digital
objects and attempt to bind recipients to obligations to all other recipients would, if
valid, pose an unlimited risk to the user.
IV. PENDING STATUTORY INITIATIVES
In the United States, the European Union, and elsewhere, legislative and regulatory
initiatives are pending that are aimed at trying to adapt contract to the online world.
Much of the attention has been directed to electronic authentication and digital
signatures. In this paper I am leaving aside that issue, however, and will instead focus
primarily on the proposed Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act
("UCITA," formerly proposed Article 2B of the UCC), and the proposed Uniform
Electronic Transactions Act ("UETA"). Both of these proposed uniform acts were
approved by the National Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in July 1999 for
presentation to state legislatures. 2 The UETA by its terms applies only to transactions
not within the scope of UCITA. The two proposed acts are quite different in their
approach to adaptation of the law to facilitate transactions in the online world. To
oversimplify, UETA retains the contract-as-consent model and merely aims to
remove specific obstacles in the way of contracting electronically; whereas UCITA
moves significantly toward the contract-as-product model and aims to change the
substantive law in that direction. UETA takes up a few pages; UCITA a few hundred.
A. "Click-Wrap" Validation
A primary impetus for the proposed Article 2B of the UCC was to add information
licensing transactions to the UCC in such a way as to validate shrink-wrap licenses.
The proposed legislation became extremely controversial, and the American Law
Institute failed to approve the Article 2B draft for proposed inclusion in the Uniform
Commercial Code, which is how it became a freestanding initiative renamed UCITA.
The reasons the Article 2B draft was so controversial make UCITA equally
controversial. One reason is its shrink-wrap validation and other expansions of
licensors' rights at the expense of licensees. It is also insufficiently attentive to how
its language and provisions would interact with the intellectual property schemes. In
addition, it threatens to create rather than relieve complexity, in several dimensions.
It is long and detailed and attempts to restate substantive law in some respects, and
to make new substantive law in other respects; the draftsmanship invites conflicting
32. See Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (visited June 9, 2000) <http://www.
law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/uecicta/eta1299.htm> [hereinafter UETA Draft]; Uniform Computer
Information Transactions Act (visited June 9, 2000) <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/
ucita/ucita200.htm> [hereinafter UCITA Draft]. As this Article goes to press, the UETA has
been enacted by California and Pennsylvania. The UCITA has been enacted in Virginia and
is pending in Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Utah. The Virginia
enactment, which does not go into effect until July 1, 2001, establishes a special advisory
group to evaluate impacts and possibly propose amendments. See Act of Mar. 14, 2000, ch.
101, 2000 Va. Laws 157.
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interpretations. Worse, perhaps, carve-outs for specific industries and exclusions of
areas of subject matter mean that many transactions would be subject partly to
UCITA and partly to other law.33
UCITA is potentially very important legislation. It applies to "computer
information transactions. 34 Computer information is "information in electronic form
that is obtained from or through the use of a computer or that is in digital or
equivalent form capable of being processed by a computer."35 Computer information
transactions include not only licenses, but also any agreement "to create, modify,
transfer, or license computer information or informational rights in computer
information." '36 And informational rights include "all rights in information created
under laws governing patents, copyrights, mask works, trade secrets, trademarks,
publicity rights, or any other law that gives a person... a right to control...
information."'37 Since almost everything these days (a book, for example) might be
interpreted as being in a form "equivalent" to digital form, the reach of UCITA is
potentially breathtaking.
The provisions of UCITA that have the effect of validating most shrink-wrap
licenses and the analogous Web contracts involve creation of a new category called
"mass-market" transactions. Mass-market transactions are defined as being directed
to the general public as a whole under substantially the same terms for the same
information. Transactions come within this definition if they are at retail, whether the
customer is a business or a consumer. The notion of consent is embodied
in-metamorphosed into--a concept of "manifesting assent."'38 Manifestation of
assent can include breaking the shrink-wrap, clicking on a link, or commencingto use
information.39
It certainly seems that UCITA's definition of manifestation of assent stretches the
ordinary concept of consent (contested as it was). That stretching starts with the
substitution of the word "assent" for the word "consent." In my dictionary, "consent"
is one of the meanings of "assent. '4' Nevertheless, "assent" has connotations of
acquiescence, of mere failure to remove oneself from a process; "consent," on the
other hand, seems surrounded with more connotations of voluntary involvement of
oneself in a process. (As I will later discuss, under UCITA even machines can
manifest "assent," so at least at that point the notion of voluntariness is absent.) By
33. See Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract Law in the Information Age: The
Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Transactions in
Information andElectronic Commerce, 13 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 809 (1998). For an overview,
see Pamela Samuelson, Foreword, 13 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 809 (1998). For specific criticisms
aimed primarily at UCITA's preemption of state consumer protection regimes, see Letter from
22 State Attorneys General to National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
(July 23, 1999), available in <http://www.arl.orglinfo/frn/copy/agoppltr.html> (opposing
UCITA).
34. UCITA Draft, supra note 32, § 103(a).
35. Id. § 102(a)(10).
36. Id. § 102(a)(1 1).
37. Id. § 102(a)(38).
38. Id. § 112.
39. See id. § 112(a)(2), (d) & cmts.
40. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIcTIONARY 131 (Merriam-Webster 1993).
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substituting "assent," UCITA seems to be validating the take-it-or-leave-it nature of
the terms that come with these mass-market transactions. By assimilating such terms
to the category of contract, UCITA, insofar as it can be read as doing anything
coherent, is drifting toward explicit endorsement of the contract-as-product model.4
B. Machine-Made Contracts
1. Electronic Agents
The proposed UCITA attempts a comprehensive, thickly legislated approach to
contracting in the information economy. For transactions not covered by UCITA, the
proposed Uniform Electronic Transactions Act takes avery different approach, which
might be termed thin enablement.42 It is interesting to compare the approaches to
machine-made contracts in these proposed statutes. In particular, what is their
approach to defining consent in this context?
Section 5 of UETA provides that the Act "only applies to transactions between
parties each ofwhich has agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means."43 Once
such an agreement is found, UETA simply provides that the ensuing transactions will
not be invalid merely because machine-made." Thus prior law is left in place. The
UETA drafters hope that this approach will prevent the Act from becoming obsolete
as technology advances.45
41. See UCITA Draft, supra note 32, § 112 cmt. 4 ("The described product defines the
bargain."). Assent occurs if "objective indicia" allow the inference that a party had reason to
know that his act or failure to act "will be viewed by the other party as indicating assent."
UCITA Draft Official Comments § 112 cmt. 3(b) (visited June 9, 2000) available in <http:ll
www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulcucita/ucitacom300.htm> [hereinafter UCITA Draft Official
Comments]. (This puts the burden on the recipient to figure out the other party's propensity
to infer things.) Factors showing that "a person has 'reason to know' that the conduct will lead
the other party to believe that there was assent" include: "language on a display, package, or
that is otherwise made available to the party." Id. This seems to say that putting on my site
something like "continuing to use this site means that you've agreed to my terms" might work
as "manifesting assent" to my terms, especially since another factor in the list is "the fact that
the party can decline and return the information, but decides to use it." Id. So, it looks like
whenever I have access to a site and look at it, I've manifested assent to its terms.
42. See UETA Draft, supra note 32, § 5(b). The drafters carefully state that UETA "does
not make specific reference to usage of trade and other party conduct," and the Act "is not
intended to affect the construction of the parties' agreement under the substantive law
applicable to a particular transaction. Where that law takes account of usage and conduct in
informing the terms of the parties' agreement, the usage or conduct would be relevant as 'other
circumstances' included in the definition under this Act." Id. § 2 cmt. I. See generally Amelia
H. Boss, Searching for Security in the Law of Electronic Commerce, 23 NOVA L. REV. 585
(1999) (comparing the approaches of UCITA and UETA).
43. UETA Draft, supra note 32, § 5(b).
44. Thus, UETA's core provision is the following: "A contract may not be denied legal
effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used in its formation." Id. §
7(b).
45. Id. § 2 cmt. 5. That comment states:
While this Act proceeds on the paradigm that an electronic agent is capable of
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How does UETA contemplate determining whether each party has agreed to
conduct transactions electronically? Section 5 provides that such an agreement "is
determined from the context and surrounding circumstances, including the parties'
conduct."46 That section also provides a nonwaivable right to back out of conducting
any more transactions electronically.47 How much is left of the traditional picture of
autonomous consent? It is clear that the picture is not gone. The drafting committee
invoked voluntariness and autonomy: "The paradigm of this Act is two willing parties
doing transactions electronically. It is therefore appropriate that the Act is voluntary
and preserves the greatest possible party autonomy to refuse electronic
transactions."48
But the drafting committee proceeded to make clear that its definitions of
voluntariness and autonomy did not rise to the level of requiring express agreements.
If this Act is to serve to facilitate electronic transactions, it must be applicable
under circumstances not rising to a full fledged contract to use electronics. While
absolute certainty can be accomplished by obtaining an explicit contract before
relying on electronic transactions, such an explicit contract should not be
necessary before one may feel safe in conducting transactions electronically.
Indeed, such a requirement would itself be an unreasonable barrier to electronic
commerce....49
It is unclear what the committee means by "circumstances not rising to a full
fledged contract."50 Perhaps the committee equates "full fledged contract" with
"4explicit contract" and "absolute certainty." If so, it is paying homage to a strict
version of the traditional picture of contract-as-consent.
In its gloss on section 5(b), the committee said:
Subsection (b) provides that the Act applies to transactions in which the parties
have agreed to conduct the transaction electronically. In this context it is essential
that parties' actions and words be broadly construed in determining whether the
requisite agreement exists. Accordingly,- the Act expressly provides that the
party's [sic] agreement is to be found from all circumstances, including the
parties' conduct. The critical element is the intent of a party to conduct a
performing only within the technical strictures of its preset programming, it is
conceivable that, within the useful life of this Act, electronic agents may be
created with the ability to act autonomously, and not just automatically. That is,
through developments in artificial intelligence, a computer may be able to "learn
through experience, modify the instructions in their own programs, and even
devise new instructions."
Id. (quoting Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, Can Computers Make Contracts?, 9 HARv. J.L.
& TEcH 25 (1996)). If such developments occur, courts may construe the definition of
electronic agent accordingly, in order to recognize such new capabilities.
46. Id. § 5(b).
47. "A party that agrees to conduct a transaction by electronic means may refuse to conduct
other transactions by electronic means. The right granted by this subsection may not be waived
by agreement." Id. § 5(c).
48. Id. § 5 cmt. 2.
49. Id. § 5 cmt. 3.
50. Id.
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transaction electronically. Once that intent is established, this Act applies.5'
If intent to conduct a transaction electronically is the critical element, it is unclear
how such a finding of intent could fall short of being a finding of full-fledged
contract, unless the picture of full-fledged contract here assumed means express
communications between the parties. That makes full-fledged contract a very strict
version of the traditional picture.
Contrast this with the indicia that count as "manifestation of assent" in UCITA.
Instead of asking for intent of both parties, UCITA asks for objective characteristics
of reason to know on the part of one party what the other party will infer. UCITA's
provisions about electronic agents are similarly difficult to parse, but also seem to
move away from the traditional picture of consent. For example, UCITA provides
that "[a] person that uses an electronic agent that it has selected for making an
authentication, performance, or agreement, including manifestation of assent, is
bound by the operations of the electronic agent, even if no individual was aware of
or reviewed the agent's operations or the results of the operations."52 UCITA then
goes on to provide that "[a]n electronic agent manifests assent to a record or term if,
after having an opportunity to review it, the electronic agent... engages in operations
that in the circumstances indicate acceptance of the record or term."'
In the traditional picture, of course, it would have been impossible to attribute
consent to machines, because machines are not autonomous beings. The Kantian
category of human agency does not fit the world of machines. It even seems odd to
attribute "assent" to machines, because even though assent has connotations of
passive acquiescence, it still retains some overtones of an autonomous being that
chooses to be passive. The problem is that an electronic agent is not the same kind of
agent as a human agent-unless we have left Kantian categories completely behind.
UCITA is quite unselfconscious in the way it mixes together terms of human agency
and computer agency. UCITA's nonchalance in doing, so is evidence that, unlike
UETA, it does'not retain much from the traditional picture of autonomous consent.
What will count as evidence that a computer manifested its assent? "[O]perations
manifesting assent may be proved in any manner, including a showing that a
procedure existed by which.., an electronic agent must have engaged in the conduct
or operations in order to [obtain, or to proceed with use of the information or
informational rights.]" "
In the same vein, blindly lumping together persons and machines, UCITA also
posits that computers can "infer" that a person is assenting to something. "A person
manifests assent... if the person. . . after having an opportunity to review the record
or term... intentionally engages in conduct or makes statements with reason to know
that the other party or its electronic agent may infer ... that the person
assents. . .""
I guess this means that if I "intentionally"56 tap a key that pushes a button that sets
51.Id. §5 cmt. 4.
52. UCITA Draft, supra note 32, § 107(d).
53. Id. § 112(b).
54. Id. § I12(d).
55. Id. § 112(a) (emphasis added).
56. "Intentionally" with respect to what? "Intending" that the key go down? "Intending"
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the otherparty's computer program in motion, I ambound to the other party's terms,
provided I had an "opportunity" to see them, whether or not I actually saw them. I
guess that when I do something that sets the other party's computer program in
motion, in the world of UCITA that computer program is "inferring" something from
my acts. Note also that "[a]n interaction of electronic agents creates a contract if the
parties use the agents to achieve that type of result and the operations of the electronic
agents indicate that a contract exists.""7 Whatever all this means, we are not in the
land of traditional consent.
2. Electronic Enforcers
Legal support for trusted systems has been enacted in the form of the provisions of
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act aimed at preventing disablement of copy
protection and management systems.5" Under these provisions, circumventing a
digital rights management system willfully for commercial gain is a crime, and it may
be a crime under certain conditions even to manufacture equipment that can be used
to circumvent such a system.
59
Legislation has not yet regulated the other side of the picture, creating legal
limitations on such systems. Nor have the courts yet had the opportunity to do so. A
number of commentators believe that legal limitations are needed because these
systems can be used permanently to privatize information that the intellectual
property regimes place in the public domain, freely available to users.' This problem
will be especially acute if the use of such systems becomes widespread so that lots
of information turns out to be unavailable from other sources that are not self-
enforcing.
UCITA proposes some limitations on electronic enforcers. Section 605 provides
that "[a] party entitled to enforce a limitation on use of information may include an
automatic restraint in the information or a copy of it,"'" if certain other conditions are
met, which I will discuss momentarily. This might mean that no one is entitled to
maintain a restraint system on information whose copyright has expired or which has
ceased to be a trade secret, or to lock up information otherwise in the public
domain-for example by operation of the merger doctrine. If it does mean this, then
the section contemplates legal constraints on trusted systems to prevent them from
overreaching. It is still unclear how this provision would be enforced; maybe those
who receive content protected by such a system are expected to go to court and ask
for an injunction to prevent the rights management system from protecting
information in which it does not own rights. The other conditions to be met by
technological restraints are:
that the key have some effect on the operations of my computer? "Intending" that they key
check a box that appears on my screen?
57. UCITA Draft Official Comments, supra note 41, § 206 cmt. 2.
58. 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201 (West Supp. 1999).
59. See id.
60. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 15, at 473; Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property and
Contract Law for the Information Age: The Impact ofArticle 2B of the Uniform Commercial
Code on the Future oflnformation and Commerce, 87 CAL L. REv. 1, 4 (1999).
61. UCITA Draft, supra note 32, § 605(b).
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[A party may use such a restraint] if:
(1) a term of the agreement authorizes use of the restraint;
(2) the restraint prevents a use that is inconsistent with the agreement;
(3) the restraint prevents use after expiration of the stated duration of the contract
or a stated number of uses; or
(4) the restraint prevents use after the contract terminates, other than on expiration
of a stated duration or number of uses, and the licensor gives reasonable notice to
the licensee before further use is prevented. 2
Note the "or" which (if read literally) makes this list disjunctive. Therefore, it
appears (1) that if an agreement authorizes use of a restraint, the restraint can do
anything that agreement provides it can do; and, (2) without any agreement or notice
that such a restraint is in operation, the content provider may automatically enforce
its own interpretation of the limits on the rights granted to the recipient. (Does it
really mean this? Or does it mean that some sort of agreement or at least notice that
such a system is in operation is required?) The licensed program canjust turn offwith
no notice (3) when the user reaches the end of what is granted (according to the
licensor's interpretation thereof), and subsection (d) ofthis same section provides that
a party using such a restraint system "is not liable for any loss caused by the use."'63
The notice required in section 605(d)(4) seems a small concession to licensees for
situations, for example, in which licensor claims the contract has been breached
because there has been a dispute over payment.' Another concession to licensees in
this section involves prohibiting punitive technology systems that destroy your own
information if their programmed version ofthe deal has it that you are exceeding your
rights. 65
C. Viral Contracts
It is clear that UCITA validates the typical restraints on alienation used in the
software publishing industry. It is not so clear whether UCITA contemplates running
contractual obligations. Section 503, based on section 2-210 of the UCC, provides:
(1) A party's interest in a contract may be transferred unless the transfer:
(B)... would materially change the duty of the other party, materially increase the
burden or risk imposed on the other party, or materially impair the other party's
property or its likelihood or expectation of obtaining return performance.
(2) [A] term prohibiting transfer of a party's interest is enforceable. .....
62. Id.
63. Id. § 605(d).
64. The interaction between this subsection and section 816, entitled "Limitations on
Electronic Self-Help," is unclear. Perhaps they are intended as alternatives, although that is not
said. Section 816 seems to be a complex elaboration of procedures to follow in the event that
licensor wants to turn off the system after declaring a breach. It requires separate manifestation
of assent to a term authorizing electronic self-help, and sets out a complex notice procedure to
be followed before using self-help. See id. § 816.
65. See id. § 605(c).
66. Id. § 503.
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Then section 504 provides:
(a) A transfer of "the contract" or of "all my rights under the contract", or a
transfer in similar general terms, is a transfer of all contractual rights. Whether the
transfer is effective is determined under Section 503 and 508(a)(1)(B).
(b) The following rules apply to a transfer of a party's contractual rights:
(1) The transferee is subject to all contractual use terms.
(2) Unless the language or circumstances otherwise indicate, as in a transfer as
security, the transfer delegates the duties of the transferor and transfers its rights.
(3) Acceptance of the transfer is a promise by the transferee to perform the
delegated duties. The promise is enforceable by the transferor and any other party
to the original contract.
(4) The transfer does not relieve the transferor of any duty to perform, or of
liability for breach of contract, unless the other party to the original contract
agrees that the transfer has that effect.67
Subsections 504(b)(1) and (b)(3)might be read to contemplate obligations running
with the information object. On the other hand, section 504(b)(4) maintains liability
of the original transferor (and maybe of transferees who subsequently become
transferors?), absent a three-way deal; this is in line with prior law on delegations but
inconsistent (maybe) with obligations running with the information object. Also, of
course, the effect of section 503(1)(B) might be that chains of distribution would
have to be short before it would appear that the original party would no longer feel
in control over the rights it retained or the payment it expected to receive. Because
section 503(1) talks about a party's "interest in a contract," and section 504(a) talks
about transferring "the contract" or "all rights under the contract," it seems that these
sections do not contemplate transferring a subset of rights while maintaining a
running restriction. Such incomplete transfers may turn out to be important in viral
distribution.
V. THE ISSUE OF STANDARD FORM AGREEMENTS
What happens to UCITA in the United States may well be important for global
electronic commerce. UCITA would validate most shrink-wrap licenses in the United
States, and most of the analogous Web contracts. Indeed, even if UCITA is not
enacted, during the next few years courts may begin to cite its provisions and "enact"
it themselves. If this becomes the law of the United States, it will at least be important
for the rest of the world. It may well end up being ubiquitous in practice for the rest
of the world, or even enacted into law. It may, in other words, become a standard. (It
also may not, of course. UCITA may not be enacted in the United States, and if it is
enacted its terms may not become a global standard. Also, how ubiquitous its
particular contractual architecture becomes would depend upon to what extent its own
terms are alterable by contract.)
A. Standardized Contracts and Legal Infrastructure
The rules of contract-that is, the structure of the institution of contract-constitute
67. Id. § 504.
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a legal infrastructure for commerce. Compare it to technical infrastructure, such as
the Secure Socket Layer ("SSL") protocol or the Secure Electronic Transaction
("SET") protocol. By analogy with technical standards, legal "standards"--that is,
sets of standardized terms-might reduce the transaction costs of the proliferation of
different terms and uncertain enforceability. But standards are two-sided. On the one
hand, transactions are much easier if certain sets of terms are understood by all to
govern the transaction. On the other hand, the emergence of standards, whether
through the market or by legislation, may sometimes be symptomatic of market
failure, and is often thought by courts and policymakers to signify oppression rather
than efficiency.
One way to get a technical standard is top-down, through promulgation by an
authoritative technical body such as the Institute of Electrical and Electronic
Engineers ("IEEE"). Similarly, one way to get a legal standard is promulgation by an
authoritative legal body, such as a legislature. Another way to get a technical standard
is bottom-up, through market emergence, either by industry agreement (such as the
industry standards for disk drive format) or by emergence of a dominant format (such
as Windows). Similarly, another way to get a legal standard is through industry
agreement on a set of terms (such as industry agreement on privacy terms) or by
emergence of a dominant set of terms (such as the Windows license). A top-down
standard may come about-either in the technical arena or in the legal arena-when
industry players want one but cannot agree to it among themselves. Like Hobbesian
cooperators, they might be able to coordinate enough to get the standard imposed on
them by the authoritative Leviathan, even though in the absence of Leviathan there
would be too much incentive for each one to defect.
B. Standardized Contracts and "Adhesion"
Especially from the perspective of public choice theory, it is clear that both top-
down and bottom-up standardization-both authoritative enactment and market
emergence-can be the result of market failure and can signify rent-seeking.
Powerful market actors often get legislation enacted that favors their profits at the
expense of society as a whole. Industry agreements are suspect on cartelization
grounds. Dominant standards like Windows may be the result of monopolization.
Hobbesian coordinators could be coordinating on rent-seeking rather than on
reduction of rent-seeking.
On the other hand, either method of achieving standardization could result in
efficiency gains. If workable sets of terms can be standardized, whether by market
operation or by legislative fiat, efficiency gains might well result: at minimum finms
will not have to pay armies of lawyers to think up terms like warranting that all so-
called moral rights have been waived, and the expectations ofboth sellers and buyers
will be more solidified. Legislative enactment could indeed represent reduction of
rent-seeking, the efficient solution to a coordination problem; but so could private
industry agreement. The economic issue-whether a set of uniform terms is efficient
or anti-competitive-is indeterminate in the abstract. At least economically speaking,
it is necessary to evaluate such standards in their economic context.
Traditionally, however, courts have looked more favorably on standard terms
achieved through legislation than on those achieved through industry self-regulation
or other market emergence. Courts have regarded legislation as the product of a
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democratic process and therefore prima facie in society's best interests. Market-
emergent schemes of uniform contracts, on the other hand, have to some courts and
commentators looked like a property scheme imposed by private companies for their
own interests instead of by the government for the interest of all. In other words, in
public choice rhetoric, the traditional view has been that legislative enactment is
presumptively efficiency-enhancing, and market emergence is presumptively rent-
seeking. Because market-emergent sets of terms are dictated by one party rather than
arrived at by negotiation between the parties, they have been dubbed contracts of
adhesion, or take-it-or-leave-it contracts. Courts in some circumstances have not
considered them effective to create contractual commitment on the part of the takers,
and have refused to enforce them.
There is some fuzziness about the definition of a contract of adhesion." Two basic
characteristics often mentioned are that they are (1) standard forms that are perceived
as (2) being imposed on people. One thing at stake is that these contracts seem
suspect on the issue of consent. When one set of terms becomes standard in an
industry so that the buyer cannot purchase a product without those terms, it is hard
for many observers to consider that the buyer has chosen to be bound by those terms.
Many economic analysts have pointed out that the situation is more complicated.69
Under the economic contract-as-product view, the terms themselves are a product the
consumer is buying, or are part of the package the consumer is buying (product plus
terms).7" If all buyers tend to choose these terms, then the fact that they are ubiquitous
means nothing more than that that product has won out in a free market. On the other
hand, a number of suboptimal scenarios are possible, such as cartelization, or a
"lemons equilibrium"' in which consumer lack of information causes an inferior
product to become the standard. Deciding whether any given widespread standardized
contract represents either market failure or market choice is not any easier than
deciding whether any given piece of legislation is rent-seeking or in the public
interest. There is no simple principle or algorithm that will do so.72 Lacking such a
principle, courts are likely to conclude that the more the terms seem onerous to the
court, the less likely they are to be the result of buyer choice.
C. Standardization vs. Customization
The circumstances of electronic commerce may cause standard forms to emerge.
Electronic commerce has the potential to be truly global in scope, not just for large
68. See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARv. L. REv. 1173 (1983).
69. See, e.g., Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and Paternalist Motives in Contract and Tort
Law, with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining Power, 41 MD.
L. REv. 563 (1982).
70. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms, 64 CAL. L. REV.
1151 (1976).
71. George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488, 490-91 (1970); see also Michael Spence, Consumer
Misperceptions, Product Failure, and Producer Liability, 44 REv. ECON. STUD. 561 (1977).
72. In the face of this difficulty, it often seems that for any given analyst the real criterion
for whether something is rent-seeking is whether the analyst finds it ideologically distasteful.
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purchases or multinational firms, but for very small purchases by consumers. There
is a huge upside potential here, but a strong need for harmonization before it can be
realized. Parameters that are sometimes taken for granted in the United States-for
example, jurisdiction and choice of law-will need to be spelled out for non-U.S.
interactions.73
As I mentioned earlier, one reason the world of online commerce may be organized
largely by sets of standardized terms is that such terms will work better with machine-
made contracts. Various estimates put the volume of business-to-business ("B2B")
electronic commerce orders ofmagnitude greater than business-to-consumer ("B2C")
transactions.74 Possibly because of the significant cost-savings possible through
automation,7 and the competitive pressures that make all adopt cost-saving measures
once anyone does, B2B is in the vanguard. So possibly the B2B proportion will
decline a bit when technology becomes more user-friendly for consumers and when
smaller transactions are facilitated. Nevertheless, B2B will remain a substantial
proportion of electronic commerce, and it will make significant use of machine-made
contracts.
If the use of machine-made contracts helps drive players to settle on sets of
standard terms, there may well be an advantage to using the same terms for people-
made contracts as well. Terms that are known and used, whose results have been
tested in practice, are likely to proliferate. If sets of machine-friendly terms achieve
this status, they are likely to be widely adopted. Adoption of contract terms, like
much else on the network, may involve a network externality. 6 Industry learns to
work with what is available and known to be enforceable, just as it learns to work
with available technology. A feedback loop develops as more and more players
become familiar with the terms (and therefore do not want to use different ones) and
as more courts or other bodies validate them because they have become prevalent.
The standard terms that machines can handle may become ubiquitous.
In spite of these pressures toward standardization, it is important to note that new
possibilities for individualization (customization) are also in the air. For a large
proportion of consumer transactions in the past, individual negotiation was not cost-
effective. That situation is changing. It is (or will soon be) technically feasible for a
73. See, e.g., John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace
Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J. 893 (1999).
74. See, e.g., Sharon Nash, How Big a B2B Boom, PC MAGAZINE, Feb. 1,2000, available
in <http://www.zdnet.com/pcmag/stories/trends/0,7607,2431179,00.htm>.
75. Various cost savings estimated, but widely thought to be significant. See, e.g., Kenneth
Berryman et al., Current Research: Electronic Commerce: Three Emerging Strategies, 1998
THE McKINSEY Q. 152 (between 10 and 20%)
76. Cf Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting:
hIcreasingReturns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 347,350 (1996).
The attractiveness of a standard contract term arises at least in part from the fact
that it can offer increasing returns to users as more firms adopt it. These
increasing returns can be divided into two related, but conceptually distinct, types
of benefits: (i) 'learning benefits,' which arise because a firm adopts a contract
term that has been commonly used in the past; and (ii) 'network benefits,' which
arise because a firm adopts a term that will be commonly used in the future.
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website to offer a menu of contractual terms, each with its price. For example, if I do
not want litigation to be limited to Los Angeles, I could click in a box and transmit
fifty cents more to have the choice of forum be my home state. If I do not like the
warranty, for $1.24 I could make it encompass more. In the offline world, a
rudimentary form of contractual customization is seen in separate extended warranties
for big-ticket items such as cars and electronics. The network will make it possible
to do this on a much larger scale and for much smaller transactions. In principle, the
whole operation, including the actuarial setting of the prices for such terms, could be
outsourced to firms specializing in such matters, and the transaction could be
accomplished seamlessly with the consumer's transaction at the offering website.
Such customization, if it comes to pass, will pose various policy problems. Moral
hazard comes to mind, since it might be that those who are willing to pay for a better
warranty are those who plan to use the product carelessly and cash in on the warranty.
Presumably moral hazard could be factored into the actuarial operation of pricing. A
more troubling policy question involves what terms will be offered for those who
cannot pay for the better ones. The opportunity to purchase better terms may seem to
exacerbate distinctions between haves and have-nots. Haves are not only more likely
to afford better terms, they are also more likely to have the education and risk-
assessment capability to enable them to decide whether purchasing the better terms
is worthwhile. Complex arguments could ensue. On one side, it may be argued that
onerous terms will allow the product to be offered more cheaply, allowing more poor
people to buy it; on the other side, it may be argued that the market will not force
such cost savings to be passed on to consumers, and that legislation is needed to set
minimal terms. (We have seen these arguments in the offline world on many
occasions.'z )
It is too soon to know yet whether we need to have these arguments. Even though
customization is technically feasible, it is unclear whether it will appear in the market.
For one thing, consumers may not take to it. So far there is not much reason to believe
that anyone is reading the fine print. That could change, however, if courts start
enforcing it; right now there may be a widespread belief that much of it is
unenforceable anyway. For another thing, even if customization is desired by (some)
consumers, this effect maybe overwhelmed by the pressures toward machine-friendly
terms. Of course, various levels ofmixture are possible; if customization is valued in
the marketplace, some levels of customization capabilities could be built into
machines.
In the meantime, the normal pressures of capitalism give industries a powerful
incentive to make global electronic commerce work. Especially in the B2B arena,
those who do not make it work will be dinosaurs. Right now, though, conflicting
national laws and customs and uncertainty over territorial jurisdiction keep truly
77. For example, with regard to the onerous cross-collateral clause in Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), or the implied warranty of habitability
in residential tenancies, or housing codes, or rent control. See, e.g., Arthur Allen Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PENN. L. REv. 485
(1967); Bruce Ackerman, Regulating Slum Housing Markets On Behalf of the Poor: Of
Housing Codes, Housing Subsidies and Income Redistribution Policy, 80 YALE L.J. 1093
(1971); Margaret Jane Radin, Residential Rent Control, 15 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 350 (1986).
1151
INDIANA LA WJOURN AL
global commerce still unrealized. In light of this, there is a strong incentive for
industries desiring global commerce to coordinate among themselves, either explicitly
or tacitly, to achieve standardized sets of tested terms. 78 It is orders of magnitude less
expensive to do this in the online world where everyone can see and download
everyone else's terms. The "good" ones will propagate quickly. At the same time,
achieving coordination through governmental promulgation of standards is much
more difficult because the market is global. What government can act as Leviathan
to do the promulgating? How will the coordination be achieved on such a large scale?
For these reasons, firms probably have a better chance of coordinating to achieve
standards than territorial sovereigns have of achieving legislative harmonization
through diplomacy and trade wars. This means that difficult questions will arise
regarding to what extent those sovereigns' rules of law can be contracted around in
such standardized sets of terms. The answers will likely depend on whose law
governs the decision. If the Disney contract came before a court in France at the
instance of a French citizen, the French court might find French rules about moral
right to, be important enough not to enforce the terms in the contract that select the
law of California and Los Angeles as the sole forum.79 At minimum, a market-
emergent set of workable terms will have to avoid using terms like this which will be
repugnant in some important market"0 I suspect that industry may well learn to do
this.
The traditional picture of contract still makes many people feel that standard terms
78. In spite of incentives to standardize, of course, other incentives are still at work that
have kept terms nonstandard in the past and might still keep them nonstandard. Some firms are
better at giving extensive warranties and other firms are better at selling at low prices. If
transaction costs caused by differing terms had been the strongest incentive operating in the
offline world in most cases where firm A had one set of terms and firm B had another, firms
would have had a strong incentive to arrive at standard sets of terms, and battles of the forms
might have ceased without legislative intervention. I am conjecturing that the incentives may
have altered in the networked digital environment, such that the balance may shift in favor of
firms' being willing to seek standardization aggressively.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9; cf UCITA Draft, supra note 32, §§ 109-110.
UCITA recognizes the reasonableness of choice-of-forum selection clauses in electronic
commerce:
"[It would] be entirely unreasonable to assume that a cruise passenger would or
could negotiate the terms of a forum clause in a routine commercial cruise ticket
form. Nevertheless, including a reasonable forum clause in such a form well may
be permissible for several reasons. Because it is not unlikely that a mishap in a
cruise could subject a cruise line to litigation in several different fora, the line has
a special interest in limiting such fora. Moreover, a clause establishing [the
forum] has the salutary effect of dispelling confusion as to where suits may be
brought . . . . Furthermore, it is likely that passengers purchasing tickets
containing a forum clause... benefit in the form of reduced fares reflecting the
savings that the cruise line enjoys...."
UCITA Draft Official Comments, supra note 41, § 110 cmt. 3 (alteration and omissions added)
(quoting Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 585-86 (1991)).
80. Even though UCITA is voluminous, it is minimal on the topic of impermissible terms;
it just includes a version of the UCC provision on unconscionability. See UCITA Draft, supra
note 32, § 111. A global standard will probably have to be more worked out on this issue.
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are unconsented-to. If the world of online contract turns out to be more
standardized-or more obviously standardized-than the world of offline contract,
the world of online contract will be troubling from the point of view that holds
consent requisite for binding obligation to arise. We can expect commentators
routinely to point with alarmat "private" legislation through standardized contracts.8
In the new world, do we need to reconsider consent?
VI. BACK TO THE PUZZLE OF BINDING OBLIGATION
A. The Specter of Ubiquitous Liability Rules
In the traditional picture of contract, a nonconsensual contract is oxymoronic.
When entitlements change hands under circumstances interpreted as nonconsensual,
we resist the notion that such transactions are contractual. To the extent that online
contracts are problematic on the issue of consent, they are problematic as
contracts-as long as we remain (at least rhetorically) committed to the traditional
picture. The basis of the picture is a liberal commitment to autonomy that does not
comport well with forced transactions, even for value received.
To explore the implications for the future of contract online of this entrenched
commitment to autonomy, it might be helpful to recur to its past. An influential
economic analysis of the '70s, introducing the notion of entitlements protected only
by liability rules, proposed that exceptions to the requirement of consent are
appropriate in particular kinds of circumstances, provided compensation is paid. For
example, a recurring species of real property dispute involves the party who
mistakenly becomes a trespasser by building something that encroaches on
neighboring land. If the normal property rule is applied, the trespasser will be
enjoined to remove the building. 2 In some cases, though, which may make it into the
casebooks because they are exceptional, the court decides to let the building stand
and simply charge the defendant a reasonable price for the land under it. In other
words, plaintiffs normal property rule becomes a liability rule in this particular case.
In such a case, I would always ask my students to predict the dissent, and they learned
to chorus, "Private eminent domain!" It was a good prediction every time.
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, in the article that introduced the
property-rule/liability-rule terminology, theorized that property rules are the norm,
81. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated Intellectual
Property Rights: ReconcilingFreedom of Contract with Public Good Uses ofInformation, 147
U. PA. L. REv. 875 (1999); Pamela Samuelson & Kurt Opsahl, How Tensions Between
Intellectual Property Policy and UCITA Are Likely To Be Resolved, in ECOMMERCE:
STRATEGIES FOR SUCCESS IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 741,753-54 (Practicing Law Inst. 1999).
82. In a Coasean interpretation of what happens next, this means that the trespasser must
buy the portion of the neighboring land that is encroached upon; and economic theory says that
plaintiff's price can come close to what defendant would otherwise lose if it had to tear down
the building. Students (and some courts) tend to feel that this is extortionate. On the other hand,
if defendant need only pay a "reasonable" price to keep the land, defendants like this one will
not be deterred from making mistakes of this kind, since at worst they will have to pay only a
"reasonable" price, which is what they would have to pay anyway if they were to negotiate ex
ante.
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and liability rules are literally the exception that proves the rule. The general
argument that property rules are best has two parts: the first, to which most of
Calabresi and Melamed's attention was devoted, is that property rules are prima facie
efficient; and the second, to which they alluded more tentatively, is that property rules
are superior from the viewpoint of individual autonomy.83 The exceptions, where
liability rules are better, involve circumstances where property rules will not be
efficient, and perhaps circumstances where property rules will not serve distributional
goals.
Calabresi and Melamed mainly elaborated one class of circumstances that render
property rules inefficient: market failure caused by the high cost of coordination in
situations where either buyers or sellers are numerous (the famous freeriders and
holdouts). This in fact is what justifies governmental eminent domain.84 In their
discussion of distributional goals, they had in mind situations where we might want
the government to facilitate coordination of relatively wealthy buyers to buy out
poorer people (better for distributional goals, presumably, than a process whereby the
wealthy simply use the legislative process to impose on the poor).85 The example
Calabresi and Malamed used was a factory that employed lots of workers but used
polluting cheap coal; they suggested thit a legally structured liability rule could
enable wealthier folks who desired clean air to compensate the factory and its
workers.8 6 This argument is controversial. It might suggest, for example, that we
should enable neighbors to coordinate to condemn the right of an owner of vacant
land to develop low-income housing; or it might suggest that workers should be
enabled to condemn and buy out a firm that threatens to relocate its plant.
The argument is controversial, I suppose, precisely because "private eminent
domain" is so difficult for us to countenance, at least in theory. Indeed, Calabresi and
Melamed, in their dialogue with a hypothetical na've first-year student about criminal
law, explained that it would not do just to charge thieves (or trespassers) damages
equal to the value of what they took without the owner's consent, because that would
allow them to change property rules into liability rules at will. Hence, an "indefinable
kicker" was needed in order to deter such wholesale ability to make property rules
lapse into liability rules."
What exactly is wrong with allowing property rules to decay into liability rules
more generally, absent the exceptional circumstances described by Calabresi and
Melamed? The answer has to be something involving the conception of individual
entitlement to which we remain committed. It is a conception that involves an
individual being in control of those entitlements for the purpose of advancing her
own ends. It is a conception involving noncoercion.
Control over how and when entitlements are divested from oneself seems key to
83. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 5, at 1106-10. In this view, property rules are
better prima facie, because liability rules cause "unascertainable resentment costs" due to
coercion (lack of consent), but where there is market failure property rules can cause such
resentment costs too and presumably outweigh those coercion costs. Id. at 1107-08 n.36.
84. They also mentioned that the costs of establishing a market might in some
circumstances outweigh the costs of using liability rules instead of property rules. See id.
85. See id. at 1115-24.
86. See id. at 1121-24.
87. Id. at 1124-26.
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this embedded conception. From an economic perspective, entitlements enable me
to plan my own wealth-maximization strategy, starting with my own subjective
valuation of my entitlements, and deploying them as I find most valuable to enhance
my position. From a non-economic perspective, entitlements enable me to maintain
a stable context of things in my environment, against which I can constitute myself
as a person and live my life. If all my entitlements--or even a broad range of them,
or even some few important ones-can be divested at any time without my consent,
this disrupts the economic function of individual entitlement by ignoring my
subjective valuation and the strategies I want to pursue to maximize my wealth in
light of that valuation. From a non-economic perspective, such divestments can also
almost literally be a "rip-off" of the person.
The non-economic argument does not apply when a firm rather than a person is
being divested of entitlements without its consent. And the economic argument might
perhaps be somewhat attenuated in that case. Firms might vary less than persons in
how they subjectively value their entitlements-their valuations may tend more
toward the market price-so their economic plans and strategies for wealth-
maximization could be injured less when their property rules decay into liability
rules. This statement would be more accurate about some categories of firm assets
than others, though. Firms might vary quite a bit, for example, in how they value
particular units of human capital; they might vary less in how they value their office
equipment.
This interpretation of the background embedded conception of entitlement that lies
at the root of our distaste for "private eminent domain" begins-I am only saying
"begins"--to suggest that "private eminent domain" directed against businesses firms
might not be quite as bad as "private eminent domain" directed against individual
consumers. Nongovernmental eminent domain directed against a firm would seem
worse if directed against the kinds of assets that firms may not value at some
objective "market price." It would also seem worse under circumstances where one
firm was always able, because of market power or other reasons, to impose its terms
on another, and the other was always in the position of being the one whose
entitlements were rearranged by another, and never got to be in the position of doing
the rearranging. In other words, "private" eminent domain between firms seems
worse under conditions of nonreciprocity.
B. Contract Without Consent
Contract is supposed to be one of the quintessential cornerstones of "private"
ordering by means of markets, the other being property. (I have been putting
"private" in quotes because I accept the legal realist argument that when the
institutions of property and contract take the form of a legal infrastructure, structured
and policed by the state, there can be no such thing as a purely "private" ordering.")
The gingerly way we approach the notion of property rules decaying into liability
rules in the field of property is mirrored by a similar reluctance in the field of
entitlements that accrue to actors under contract law. The puzzle of binding
88. See, e.g., BARBARA H. FRIED, ROBERT HALEAND PROGRESSIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS
(1997).
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commitment is whether we justify party A's rearranging the entitlements of party B
(or a large number of party B's) on any basis other than consent. The contract-as-
product model countenances less voluntary bargaining and more assent to take-it-or-
leave-it terms than does the traditional contract-as-consent model. But even the
contract-as-product model seems to presuppose that actors "choose" to buy the
product-plus-terms. We still recoil from the idea of too-easy decay of property rules
into liability rules. Is there a way around this embedded tendency?
Courts rewrite the terms of contracts they find unconscionable, sometimes, rather
than merely declaring the contract null and void. 9 When they do this, they are
implementing something other than a consented-to bargain. Richard Craswell has
shown that the notion of liability rules is useful in certain classes of contracts Where
courts would consider rewriting the terms. His analysis turns on what to make of lack
of consent.90 In particular, even if the buyer does not consent to the terms, there are
cases in which it does not make sense to treat the buyer's entitlement as a property
rule-that is, hold that no contract is formed, and unwind the entire transaction.
Instead, in certain cases it makes sense to treat the buyer's entitlement as a liability
rule-that is, hold that a contract is formed-but on the terms set by the court. In
other words, under a liability rule entitlement for buyer, the court would enforce only
those terms in the contract that are deemed reasonable, or import some other terms
deemed reasonable to replace those written but not consented to.
The reasoning supplying a liability rule applies to a class of cases in which the
seller cannot cheaply correct the lack of consent. If it can, the property rule forms an
incentive to do so, and that incentive should be retained. But sometimes the seller
cannot correct the lack of consent. For example, this reasoning applies to the classic
necessity case. Suppose that someone is in such trouble (drowning, let us say) that
whoever offers to sell him something that he needs for rescue (a life preserver, let us
say) is placing him under duress. This depends upon our understanding of coercion
versus voluntariness, of course; you might be willing to call the offer noncoercive if
the price is reasonable. But if you go along with the hypothetical and assume the
situation is coercive, it would still make more sense to enforce the contract for a
reasonable price, rather than holding that no contract is formed. Such enforcement
results in decay of buyer's property rule into a liability rule; she gives up her
entitlement to her money without her voluntary consent. Otherwise, in situations
where they need rescue, buyers could not form contracts and we would presumably
be undersupplied with rescue services.9 The argument ramifies, of course, if we
believe that the buyer's economic circumstances sometimes constitute duress.
Another type of case in which the liability rule entitlement for buyer seems to make
sense is purchase of something that the buyer needs or wants, accompanied by a lot
89. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998); UCITA Draft Official Comments, supra note 41, § I11 cmt.
4.
90. See Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and
Related Doctrine, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. I (1993) [hereinafter Craswell, Properly Rules]; Richard
Craswell, Remedies When Contracts Lack Consent: Autonomy and Institutional Competence,
33 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 209 (1996) [hereinafter Craswell, Remedies].
9 1. "[I]f the coercion cannot practicably be corrected by the seller, a remedy which denied
enforcement to all unconsented obligations would effectively make transacting impossible, thus
advancing no one's autonomy." Craswell, Remedies, supra note 90, at 233.
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of fine-print terms whose meaning it would be very costly to point out and explain.
In this case, depending on the amount of savings in transaction costs, it could be
efficient for a liability rule to enforce the contract, not as written but rather on
"reasonable" terms. (Otherwise no one can make a contract without holding a three-
day seminar on what the terms mean.) As Craswell recognizes, though, it might be
preferable to refuse to substitute reasonable for unreasonable terms in such a contract,
in order to deter sellers from using unreasonable terms.92 Otherwise, sellers could
insert unreasonable terms hoping they will only be caught infrequently, knowing that
when they are caught they will still have the benefit of "reasonable" terms.93
Many of the "click-wrap" contracts in use on the Web these days do not seem to
be good candidates for liability-rule enforcement under Craswell's criteria. The
procedure by which one is supposed to be held to Disney's terms (continued use of
the site, even if one does not see the terms) is problematic on the issue of consent. If
the procedure is held to be consent, of course, then there is no problem. It seems that
UCITA might deem it to be manifestation of assent, which for UCITA would suffice
for consent. But if the procedure is not consent, then it does not seem that it would
cost a great deal to get something that looks more like consent-Disney could set up
the site so that one could not proceed unless one clicked on the terms, and Disney
could also insert a box labeled "I accept" before one could proceed to use the site.
Even if such an "I accept" box is sufficient for some sort of consent, it might not
suffice for consent to some particular terms, because they seem both confusing and
onerous. Insofar as a term is difficult to explain, such as what it means to warrant that
all so-called moral rights have been waived, it is possible that such a term is a
candidate for being replaced by a reasonable term under the Craswell analysis. It is
also possible that such terms should simply be excised, under the theory that it would
be efficient to deter use of such terms.
Craswell identified another consideration that might lead to enforcement of
contracts without consent: institutional competence.94 The argument goes like this:
At least from the point of view of economic analysis, if it would be too hard for a
court to come up with reasonable terms, it should not try; even where consent is
lacking, the court should enforce the terms as written. For example, price regulation
is difficult, so we can assume that it would be difficult for a court to come up with a
reasonable price to replace what is seen as a monopoly price. Rewriting warranties
and other nonprice terms is equally difficult. For the economist, of course, the inquiry
is comparative: the question is whether the difficulty encountered in arriving at the
court-enforced price would make that price deviate even more than the contract price
from an ideal competitive market price.
The suggestion Craswell is making here is a species of non-ideal theory. He is
advancing a risk-of-error rule.95 That rule is: If our estimates of institutional
competence tell us that a systemic admonition for courts to substitute reasonable
92. See id. at 16-17.
93. See id. at 16. This case is analogous to the builder who trespasses on neighboring land.
See supra note 82.
94. See Craswell, Remedies, supra note 90, at 221-29.
95. See Margaret Jane Radin, Risk-of-Error Rules and Non-Ideal Justification, in
JUSTIFICATION 33,34 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1986) (Nomos XXVIII).
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terms for unreasonable ones will come out worse, on balance, than a systemic
admonition for courts to let unconsented-to contracts (but only of the type where the
seller cannot readily correct the coercion) be enforced as written, then we should let
the suspect contracts be enforced as written. In a more nearly ideal world,
enforcement is contrary to the value of individual autonomy. Yet autonomy in our
non-ideal world-however threatened it may be by such contracts-might be still
more undermined by having courts intervene. This could happen, for example, if
court intervention on balance caused a rise in prices for essential products, so that
some consumers are priced out of the market for them and cannot obtain them at all.
Like all non-ideal arguments, this one has difficulties. One is that someone must
decide whether courts are "institutionally competent" to replace unreasonable terms
with reasonable ones. That someone might be the court if it is asked to intervene in
one of these suspect contracts; or the legislature if it is asked to validate a class of
them, as UCITA would.96 We might believe that some courts will do better than some
parties some of the time. But maybe courts are not the best decisionmakers to
evaluate themselves. On the other hand, we might believe that legislation is often put
forward as rent-seeking on the part of some industry, as many observers believe is the
case for UCITA and the software publishers. At least we might believe that it is very
hard to tell when legislation is rent-seeking and when it is not, and that the legislature
itself is not the best actor to be trusted with making this pronouncement.
Another difficulty is that the case-by-case method of adjudication makes it very
difficult for a judge to adhere to the systemic risk-of-error rule when she sees before
her a case that looks like egregious oppression.97 Thus, a rule like this is difficult to
maintain; it tends to decay into case-by-case consideration. If such a rule derives from
legislation, exceptions and reinterpretations will build up; if it derives from judge-
made law, prior cases will be distinguished. This is a non-ideal analysis of the
functioning of rules. It bears on the use of rules in coping with other non-ideal
features of the world such as the limits of institutional competence.
Maybe the worst difficulty is the following. When considering non-ideal arguments
about preservation of some value-autonomy in this instance-we often run into a
double bind. Ex hypothesi, autonomy is threatened by enforcement ofunconsented-to
obligations. But, as Craswell and others argue, autonomy is also threatened if none
of these is ever enforced, because then those for whom consent is questionable (for
example, those under economic duress) cannot enter enforceable contracts to buy
what they want and need.9" Craswell wants us to see that autonomy may also be
threatened if courts try to save unconsented-to contracts from being unenforceable
96. In his conclusion, Craswell seems to postpone this question: "[A]ny analysis of the
proper remedy in cases where consent is lacking must pay some attention to questions of
institutional competence. In particular, if courts are to strike down contracts whose terms are
substantively unreasonable, while allowing enforcement ofreasonable obligations, their ability
to distinguish reasonable from unreasonable obligations must be considered." Craswell,
Remedies, supra note 90, at 235. Considered by whom?
97. See Margaret Jane Radin, Presumptive Positivism in Trivial Cases, 14 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 823 (1991).
98. gee Leff, supra note I, at 155-57; Alan Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive
Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1071-73 (1977).
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by rewriting terms to make them reasonable, but turn out not to be good at this task.99
The question becomes which alternative is best (or least worst) for autonomy. This
kind of question does not seem readily answerable in the abstract. (It is the kind of
question that made me a philosophical pragmatist.)
When we are at work on this kind of question we should notice that it matters to
what extent the world of exchange consists of these contracts that are suspect on
autonomy grounds. If people right and left are having their entitlements rearranged
by other private parties without their consent, that is a different social world, and a
different setting for valuing and trying to protect autonomy, than if such occurrences
are relatively rare. But which way does the difference cut? Perhaps such an
occurrence damages my autonomy more if it happens to me out of the blue, singling
me out so to speak, than if it happens to everyone all the time. On the other hand,
perhaps the more such occurrences there are, the more endangered autonomy is-or
the more we feel it to be endangered, which in this context amounts to much the same
thing. The efficiency theorist might say that in that case demoralization costs are
rising exponentially.
The term demoralization costs, of course, was introduced by Frank Michelman in
an influential analysis about takings of private property by the government.' In that
analysis Michelman argued that demoralization costs would be higher when
individuals or specific groups were singled out to bear a substantial unexpected
diminution of the value of their entitlements, and lower when the diminution fell on
a larger and more disparate group.' In the case of takings by government, though,
we normally rely on a background political theory that supposes that the government
is using its money to benefit society as a whole. Indeed, that theory must be a
prominent reason that "public" eminent domain is not as disfavored as "private"
eminent domain. When we believe society as a whole is benefitted, and the costs are
spread widely, this political theory would hold that lack of individual consent to a
particular rearrangement of entitlements is replaced by the consent of the governed
to bear rearrangements of that kind.
02
To the extent we accept this background political theory, then, autonomy is not
threatened but rather instantiated or fostered when individuals bear widely spread
costs that are necessary for the existence of the government that supports their
autonomy as citizens. Again, to the extent we accept such a background political
theory, lack of consent by private parties to bear rearrangement of their entitlements
at the hands of other private parties can never blend into consent of the governed if
the rearrangements are systematic enough. It seems, then, that as long as we accept
such a background political theory, demoralization will rise the more prevalent such
unconsented-to rearrangements become.
Of course, the background social theory I am talking about, a sort of ordinary-
discourse social contractarianism, places great emphasis on the public/private
99. See Craswell, Remedies, supra note 90, at 232.
100. See Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
101. See id. at 1229-34.
102. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 417 (1922) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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distinction. It assumes that the government acts in the public interest. I do not need
to recapitulate here all the critiques from the right and the left, including some of my
own, that undermine the public/private distinction. When all the undermining is done,
though, where are we? Have we reached a point where we can consider the social
benefit of systems of unconsented-to contracts imposed by private parties in the very
same way we consider the social benefit of statutory provisions imposed by a
legislature?
If we have not---except perhaps for the vanguard of economic analysts-then if
unconsented-to contracts fill the contractual space, and, most important, we perceive
them to be doing so, autonomy will be threatened. Tentatively, I suggest that the
emerging forms of online contracts I have described in this Article may make it hard
for people to avoid seeing that commercial life now consists largely of obligations
being imposed on people without consent.
Another way to look at this situation, of course, is that we can give up consent, or
at least redefine it. UCITA seems to redefine consent. Some people now believe that
Microsoft, Disney, AT&T, AOL, and others, when they act to maximize profits, are
acting in the best interest of everyone, or at least are not any worse in that regard than
our governments. I suppose such a belief could engender a widespread trust in
business entities to rearrange our entitlements without our consent. (But this belief
that what is good for corporate profit is good for America is a very old one-we
would have to ask why it has not yet accomplished a general decay of property rules
into liability rules.) At any rate, if we wanted to, we could conceive of such trust as
constituting implied consent vis-a-vis private firms that promulgate terms that bind
us, rather analogous to the old picture of consent of the governed vis-a-vis public
actions that devalue our entitlements. In doing this we would finally be giving up on
the public/private distinction.
I am just being playful here. (I think.) But note that this scenario has the interesting
result that firms that have terms imposed on them by other firms might protest more
loudly than consumers. Even if consumers trust firms-as much as or more than
government-to impose obligations on them absent their consent, the level of trust
might be lower between firms that always find themselves in the buyer position vis-i-
vis a dominant firm that is always a seller. Indeed, firms that often find themselves
in the licensee position are the ones that finally raised a ruckus about the licensor-
friendly UCITA.
CONCLUSION
The advent of online contracts at least will make us realize that there is a
disjunction between transactional practice and the traditional picture of contract-as-
consent. The transparency of Web contracts lets us see more of the terms that come
with access to information products. Although customization is technologically
possible on the Web as never before, nevertheless machine-made contract and the
global scope of electronic commerce may result in more standardization and even less
room for old-fashioned bargaining. What will happen to the liberal ideal of requiring
consent before parting with one's entitlements?
Even before the digital era, the traditional model of contract-as-consent has become
attenuated in practice. Most run-of-the-mill transactions are governed by terms that
receiving parties cannot read or do not care to read, perhaps because their time would
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not be efficiently spent reading them. Contractual terms have come to be considered,
at least by economists, as part of the product, a package deal, rather than something
separate. The choice to buy the product blends into the "choice" to "assent to" the
terms it comes with. The attenuation of consent in online contracts is thus not a
radical shift, but rather further evolution along these lines.
That being so, should we insist on maintaining the liberal ideal of consent? If so,
could we make it bear on practice rather than maintaining it merely in rhetoric? If the
future of contract makes it ever more clear that the only point of choice is whether or
not to buy the product-plus-terms, we could focus our attention on making that choice
really a choice. One thing necessary for real choice is to make sure that a competing
array of products-plus-terms is available in the market. That may be hard to do in the
face of network economics, and in the absence of global implementation of
competition policy. At least it seems fair to say that technological self-enforcement
systems should be scrutinized from the point of view of competition policy when they
lock up information under onerous terms and the information is not available
elsewhere under other terms. (Because we are dealing with information and not with
widgets, they should be scrutinized as well from the point of view of freedom of
expression policy, but that is a topic for another article.)
This market prophylaxis is not really a solution to the problem of consent, however.
In order for it to be a solution, we would need to fulfill a background condition that
products-plus-terms be adequately disclosed to buyers, so that the choice whether or
not to buy will count as an autonomous choice. (What makes disclosure adequate?
Whatever is needed to make choice autonomous-a deep question not amenable to
a simple answer.) But this is the background condition that modem commerce cannot
often fulfill. Even if purveyors of products-plus-terms tell the truth about them, even
if all the fine print is on the website for all to peruse and download if they wish, it is
not efficient or even possible for buyers to take the time to understand all this
information. The supposed exceptional case for liability-rule treatment may become
the unexceptional run-of-the-mill case.
If that is the case, the only ameliorative avenue I can see is for policymakers to take
on the task of deciding which terms it is important to draw buyers' attention to in
order to preserve their autonomy, and which kinds of terms must be simply excluded
on autonomy grounds. Redress limited to Los Angeles could be in the first category;
waiver of all personal privacy rights could be in the second. About these things there
will be many debates, but we should start having them, rather than thinking they can
be avoided. For a new generation, and in far greater detail, we will need to follow in
the footsteps of the kinds of rules that told us what had to be made conspicuous, or
separately explicitly agreed to, and what could not be included at all. Who will be the
policymakers making these decisions? We do not know yet-perhaps new forms of
international and public/private cooperation will emerge to tackle the problem. All
I am saying right now is that the problem should be on everyone's radar screen.
Postscript: Even though I have suggested that "regulation" can take place through
new kinds of coalitions and is not solely a matter for a legislature or a court, I have
ended up arguing for "regulation" in an era in which anything called regulation is
deeply mistrusted. So let me just mention my final realist caveat. Those who want to
eschew "regulation" are nevertheless always in favor of interventions to correct
market failure, protect parties from force and fraud, enforce legitimate agreements
and expectations, and otherwise provide the needed infrastructure without which a
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market cannot function. In any given roomful of entrepreneurs, though they all detest
"regulation," it always turns out that one person's regulation is another person's free-
market hygiene. I hope that ideological labels will not prevent us from working
constructively on the future of consent in the contractual infrastructure of electronic
commerce.
